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CASE COMMENTS
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION PERMITTED TO RAISE PUBLIC WELFARE
JUSTIFICATION IN DEFENSE OF GROUP BOYCOTT
Wilk v. AMAI, No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. IM. Jan. 30, 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 81-1331 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 1981)
In Wilk v. AMAI the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois2 clarified the proper level of judicial scrutiny in antitrust actions
against professional organizations3 by allowing a defendant profes-
sional organization to prove some public benefit from the alleged viola-
tions to avoid a finding of prima facie liability.
4
Five licensed chiropractors brought suit against the American Medi-
cal Association' and several state and local medical organizations, 6 al-
l. No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. III. Jan. 30, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1331 (7th Cir. Feb. 26,
1981). The full name of the suit is Dr. Chester A. Wilk, D.C.; Dr. James W. Bryden, D.C.; Dr.
Patricia B. Arthur, D.C.; Dr. Steven G. Lumsden, D.C.; and Dr. Michael D. Pedigo, D.C. v.
American Medical Ass'n; American Hospital Ass'n; American College of Surgeons; American
College of Physicians; Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosps.; American College of Radiology;
American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons; American Osteopathic Ass'n; American Academy of
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation; Illinois State Medical Soc'y; Chicago Medical Soc'y; The
Medical Soc'y of Cook County; H. Doyl Taylor;, Dr. Joseph A. Sabatier, Jr., M.D.; Dr. H. Thomas
Ballantine, M.D.; and Dr. James H. Sammons, M.D. Plaintiffs alleged that each defendant partic-
ipated in a group boycott initiated by the AMA against the chiropractic profession. See Com-
plaint at 1-8, Wilk v. AMA, No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 2, 1976).
2. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants on January 30, 1981. Wilk v. AMA,
No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. II. Jan. 30, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1331 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 1981).
Judge Nicholas J. Bua gave the jury instructions consistent with the test endorsed at notes 41-44
infra and accompanying text. Instructions to Jury at 7136-40, Wilk v. AMA, No. 76 C 3777 (N.D.
Ill., Jan. 29, 1981) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly) [hereinafter cited as
Instructions to Jury].
3. Although no court has attempted to present a precise definition of the learned profes-
sions, courts have consistently treated professions such as law, medicine, and engineering different
than other professions under the antitrust laws. See, eg., National Soc'y of Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 684 (1978) (engineers); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.7
(1975) (lawyers); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1980)
(doctors). See also Note, The Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations After Goldfarb.- Re-
formulating the Learned Professions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1047, 1057
n.60.
4. See notes 14-20 infra and accompanying text.
5. The AMA is the largest medical association in the United States. Approximately 80% of
all physicians in the country are members. See Complaint at 4, Wilk v. AMA, No. 76 C 3777
(N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 2, 1976); Comment, The American MedicalAssociatilon Power, Purpose and
Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE LJ. 938, 939 (1954). The AMA sets national policies on
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leging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.7
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to
monopolize health care services8 by engaging in a group boycott 9 to
eliminate competition from chiropractors. In its instructions to the
health care, influences actions of individual physicians, determines educational requirements in
medical schools, and controls practice conditions, including access to hospital staffs and facilities.
Kaplin, Professional Power and Judicial Review: An Overview, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 710, 710-
12, 720 (1976); Comment, supra at 1018. See also Complaint at 16-25; Wilk v. AMA, No. 76 C
3777 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 2, 1976).
6. See note 1 supra.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See 21 CONG. REc. 2455-68 (1890). Senator Sherman, the spon-
sor of the first antitrust statutes, viewed antitrust statutes as a codification of the common law of
unreasonable restraints on trade. Id. at 2456. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), the Supreme Court recognized the evils that trusts perpetrated.
[T]he main cause which led to the [Sherman Act] was the thought that it was required by
the economic conditions of the times, that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the
hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous development of corporate organi-
zation, the facility for combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that the
facility was being used, and that combinations known as trusts were being multiplied,
and the widespread impression that their power had been and would be exerted to op-
press individuals and injure the public generally.
Id. at 50. The Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), described the
purpose of the antitrust laws:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition. . . [and] rests on the premise that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material pro-
gress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions.
Id. at 4. See also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1971) (antitrust laws are
as important to the presentation of economic freedom as the Bill of Rights is to our personal
freedom). See generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 401 (1978); Bork, Legisla-
live Intent and the Policy ofthe Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 7, 10 (1966); Letwin, Congress and
the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CH. L. REV. 221 (1956).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of a
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides in part: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... "
8. Complaint at 11, Wilk v. AMA, No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 2, 1976).
9. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the group boycott involved a ban on referrals to or from
chiropractors; a refusal to allow chiropractors access to AMA-controlled hospitals; a ban on pro-
fessional or scholarly association between phyisicians and chiropractors; and an endorsement and
sponsorship of antichiropractic research by the AMA. Id. at 17-19. The defendants alleged that
the effects of this group boycott were the limitation of medical knowledge; impairment of quality
patient care; loss of income to chiropractors; and limited access of chiropractors to hospital facili-
ties and staff. Id. at 26-28.
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jury, 0 the District Court held: A jury may consider a professional as-
sociation's public welfare justification for an alleged per se violation of
the antitrust laws.'1
The antitrust laws attempt to eliminate anticompetitive business
practices by facilitating free market competition. 2 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits every contract, trust, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce.' 3 Courts originally adopted a literal interpreta-
tion of section 1 and consequently held every restraint illegal per se
regardless of its reasonableness or public benefit. 14 The dogmatism of
10. Instructions to Jury, supra note 2.
11. Id. at 7138-40. District Court Judge Bua instructed the jury:
In judging whether a particular professional standard in operation produces an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade, it is necessary to consider the genuineness of the justification
advanced in support of the standard, the reasonableness of the standard itself, the man-
ner of its enforcement, and the effects of it on the relevant area of trade or commerce.
The fact that an ethical standard which affects the conduct of one profession, such as
medical doctors, may also have an indirect effect on the activities of another profession,
such as chiropractors, does not alone mean that it amounts to an unreasonable restraint
of trade. Rather, the determination to be made is whether, as a consequence of the
operation of that standard, there has been a cognizable adverse effect on the public inter-
est in the sense that the opportunity of chiropractors to provide services they are licensed
to provide and the opportunity of the public to receive those services has been unreason-
ably impaired or obstructed.
It is a different question, however, whether members of the medical profession may
limit their own relationships with chiropractors for the purpose of practicing their own
profession according to standards they consider necessary or desirable for the proper
practice of medicine.
Id. See notes 55-58 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. See also 21 CONG. REc. 2455-68 (1890). As
Senator Sherman stated, monopolies
control the market, raise(s) or lower(s) prices, as will best promote its selfish interests
.. . and advance prices at will where competition does not exist. Its governing motive is
to increase the profits of the parties composing it. The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by
competition, compels it to disregard the interest of the consumer.
Id. at 2457. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 49-62 (1910); Bork, supra note
7, at 10.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
14. At common law, only those restraints that unreasonably restrained trade were illegal.
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-29 (1897). The Trans-Mis-
souri case is a classic example of the early strict interpretation of the Sherman Act. Justice
Peckham, refusing to accept a "reasonableness" standard not indicated by the language of the Act,
stated:
[The Court is] asked to read into the Act by way of judicial legislation an exception not
placed there by the lawmaking branch of the government. . . . [We cannot] interpolate
an exception into the language of the act, and to thus materially alter its meaning and
effect .... If the act ought to be read (to authorize reasonable restraints), Congress is
the body to amend it and not this court, by a process of judicial legislation wholly
unjustifiable.
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this strict interpretation soon prompted adoption of a rule of reason
analysis. Under the rule of reason, only unreasonable restraints violate
the Sherman Act. 5 The rule of reason allows courts to consider the
circumstances surrounding each alleged violation while remaining
loyal to the Sherman Act's goal of promoting an efficient, competitive
marketplace.1 6
As courts applied the rule of reason, they consistently found that cer-
tain restraints were unreasonable and therefore violative of the Sher-
man Act.' 7 Courts subsequently have maintained a bifurcated system
Id. at 340. But see notes 15-20 infra and accompanying text.
15. Staidard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) is the source of the rule of reason. In
Standard Oil, the Court rejected the myopic literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. "[U]naided
by the light of reason, it is impossible to understand how the [Sherman Act] may in the future be
enforced and the public policy which it establishes be made efficacious." Id. at 68. The Standard
Oil Court asked whether the challenged acts were "unreasonably restrictive of competitive condi-
tions." Id. at 58 (emphasis added). Unreasonableness may arise from the nature or character of
the restraint or the surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference that they were intended
to restrain trade. Id.
For a discussion of the early development of the rule of reason, see Raymond, The Standard Oil
and Tobacco Cases, 25 HARv. L. RaV. 31 (1911).
The Supreme Court elaborated on the justification for the rule of reason in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to re-
strain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectiona-
ble regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238. Accord, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
16. See notes 7 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
17. Justice Black in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), articulated the
rationale for a return to the per se rule:
[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competiton and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreason-
able and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use. [The per se rule]. . . avoids the necessity for
an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history
of the industry involved'....
Id. at 5. See generally McCormick, Group Boycotts-Per Se or Not Per Se, That Is the Question, 7
SErON HALL L. RaV. 703 (1976); Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust La, 50 VA. L. REv.
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of antitrust analysis.'" Restraints that perniciously affect competition
and lack redeeming social value are illegal per se.19 Other alleged vio-
lations, which lack the indicia of per se illegality, require rule of reason
1165 (1964); von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy ofAntitrust Law, 11
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569 (1964).
Courts have both praised the per se rule for its certainty and criticized it for its myopia. Com-
pare United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972) (without per se rule it is
impossible to know limits of Sherman Act) with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 210 (1940) (per se precludes justifications for the restraint).
18. See notes 19-20infra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), justified the dual existence of the per se rule and the rule of
reason:
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrange-
ments emerge to be certain [if the actions in question trigger per se analysis] ....
[Tihey may be allowable protections. . . and within the "rule of reason." We need to
know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to
decide whether they have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack . . . any
redeeming virtue" .. and therefore should be classified as per se violations of the Sher-
man Act.
id. at 263 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
The two standards of analysis, although seemingly confusing and even paradoxical, are consis-
tent. If the alleged restraint has no redeeming social value and is of the type that judicial experi-
ence has shown to be consistently violative of the Sherman Act, the per se rule is used. If the
alleged restraint may have some redeeming social value and is not regularly found violative of the
Act, the rule of reason analysis will be implemented. Thus, consistency in applying judicial scru-
tiny harmonizes with the necessity of considering the peculiarities of a particular restraint. See
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). See generally L.
SULLiVAN, LAW OF ANTrrgUST 165-97 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Diision, 74 YALE LJ. 775 (1965).
19. Restraints that are illegal pe se include price fixing, division of markets, tying arrange-
ments, and group boycotts. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
(group boycott); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (same); Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (same); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (same); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
(tying arrangements); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (group
boycott); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (division of markets);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycott); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344 (1933) (same); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (same); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (division of markets), a f'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899). See also von Kalinowski, supra note 17, at 571-79.
The plaintiffs in Wilk v 4MA alleged that the defendants had participated in a group boycott.
See note I supra. A group boycott is a refusal to deal, or an inducement of others not to deal or to
have business relationships, with a tradesman. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank-
Americard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1973), ceri. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
For a discussion of the group boycott allegations in the Wilk case, see note 9 supra and accom-
panying text.
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analysis.20
Courts prior to the passage of the Sherman Act treated professions
differently than businesses. In his 1834 opinion in The Nymph,2' Jus-
tice Story first formulated the distinction between the trade and com-
merce of business and the public service goals of professions. Justice
Story reasoned that professions were not engaged in trade or commerce
because their goal was public service rather than profit.2 2 This distinc-
tion formed the basis of the so-called learned profession exemption
from the antitrust laws, which absolves professions from antitrust lia-
bility if they do not affect trade or commerce.2 3
InAMA v. United States 4 the Supreme Court blurred the distinction
between business and the professions. The Court declared that the ac-
tions of the AMA were the actions of a business for purposes of the
antitrust laws.2  Although the Court did not expressly eliminate the
learned profession exemption,2 6 it did cast doubt on the continuing va-
lidity of that exemption.
The source of recent confusion regarding the antitrust laws and the
learned professions is Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association.7 In
Goldfarb, the Supreme Court emphasized that no occupation is auto-
matically exempt from the antitrust laws.28 The Goldfarb Court did not
clearly indicate, however, whether a per se or rule of reason analysis
was proper in cases involving professions.2 9 Although the Court found
20. See von Kalinowski, supra note 17, at 575-76.
21. 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
22. Id. at 507. In The Nymph, Justice Story's definition of a "trade" excludes professions:
"Wherever any occupation, employment or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or
gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or learned professions, it is constantly called a trade."
Id. (emphasis added). The distinction between trades and profession thus precedes the passage of
the Sherman Act. See notes 26 & 29 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 24-26 & 28 infra and accompanying text.
24. 317 U.S. 519 (1943). InAMA, the Court found that the AMA violated the Sherman Act
in improperly interfering with the business of a prepaid health organization by threatening to
discipline AMA doctors who participated in the plan. See note 25 infra and accompanying text.
25. The Supreme Court found that participation by doctors in a prepaid health organization
was irrelevant because § 3 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every person" from restraining trade
and because the private aspects of the medical group's plan "does not remove its activities from
the sphere of business." AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943).
26. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975), the Supreme Court expressly
eliminated the Jearned professions exemption. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
27. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
28. Id. at 787.
29. Id. at 788 n.17. Chief Justice Burger suggested that professions should receive different
treatment under the antitrust laws but refused to specify what type of treatment he had in mind:
[Vol. 60:249
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the defendant bar association guilty of price-fixing, 30 normally a per se
violation,31 it acknowledged the relevance of public service by profes-
sionals.32 The Court's consideration of this factor is consistent with a
rule of reason analysis33 and not with a finding of a per se violation.
This inconsistency has been a source of confusion.34
The first notable attempt to interpret the Goldfarb decision was Femi-
nist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammed.35 In Feminist the dis-
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman
Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts
which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no
view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id. The Goldfarb Court's refusal to set down any guidelines was the source of confusion in the
lower courts. Compare National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696
(1977) (Goldfarb authorizes no broad exemption for professions) and Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammed, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1269-70 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (Goldfarb authorizes
good faith defense), afd in part and rev'd in part, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 924 (1979) with Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 560 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Goldfarb authorizes rule of reason even when professional goals commercial), cert. granted, 450
U.S. 979 (1981) and Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 630-32 (9th Cir.)
(Goldfarb authorizes per se rule for commercial goals and rule of reason for noncommercial
goals), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
30. 421 U.S. 773, 782 (1975). Chief Justice Burger stated, "This is not merely a case of an
agreement that may be inferred from an exchange of price information, for here a naked agree-
ment was clearly shown, and the effect on prices is plain." Id. (citations omitted).
31. See note 19 supra and accompanying text; note 35 infra and accompanying text.
32. 421 U.S. at 787.
33. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
34. Compare Price-Fixing, Advertising Bans, and Others Self-Regulation by Lawyers: What
Future Under Antitrust Laws, 12 COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROB. 531, 538-40 (1976) Goldfarb did not
use per se analysis; Martyn, Lawyer Advertising: The Unique Relationship Between First Amend-
ment and.Antitrust Protections, 23 WAYNE L. REv.. 167, 183 (1976) (same) and Note, supra note 3,
at 1050 (Goldfarb incorporates a version of the rule of reason) with Branca & Steinberg, Attorney
Fee Schedules and LegalAdvertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 475, 507
(1977) (Goldfarb used per se rule) and Comment, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints onAdver-
tising by Attorneys, 62 VA. L. REv. 1135, 1143-44 (1976) (same). See note 29 supra and accompa-
nying text.
35. 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976), af'dinpart andrev'dinpart, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). Feminist involved alleged economic boycotting and price-
fixing by a medical association and individual doctors against an abortion clinic. Such actions are
per se illegal under the Sherman Act. "[A]n economic boycott... carried out by members of the
medical profession is no less antithetical to free competition than is an economic boycott carried
out by nonprofessionals." Id. at 1263. See note 61 infra and accompanying text. But group
boycotts do not trigger per se analysis in every case. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National
BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 125 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974). See also
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trict court balanced the policies of the antitrust laws against the public
welfare concerns of the professions and proposed a modified per se
analysis for cases involving professional organizations.36 The Feminist
court held that the defendant could escape per se liability37 if it could
prove that it had engaged in the alleged per se violations in good faith
and for the public welfare.38
In Mackey v. NFL, 39 a case involving the physical rather than the
learned professions, the Eighth Circuit impliedly proposed an alterna-
tive interpretation of Goldfarb. The Mackey court rejected the district
court's use of the per se rule and adopted a two-pronged rule of reason
analysis. Focusing on the commercial effect of the alleged restraint, the
court first asked whether the restraint in question was essential to main-
taining a competitive balance. The court then determined whether the
restraint was the least restrictive means possible.40
McCormick, supra note 17, at 737-64; Comment, Boycott: A Specfic Deyfnition Limits the Appllca-
biityof a Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 818, 819-21 (1977).
Individuals have a right to choose with whom they will do business as long as there is no
monopolistic or commercial motive. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1974). Accord,
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc.
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). As the Worthen
court noted, "The term 'group boycott'.., is in reality a very broad label for divergent types of
concerted activity. To outlaw certain types of business conduct merely by attaching the 'group
boycott' and 'per se' labels obviously invites the chance that certain types of reasonable concerted
activity will be proscribed." 485 F.2d at 125.
36. 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976), aft'd in part and rev'dinpart on other grounds,
586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). See note 38 infra and accompany-
ing text.
37. 415 F. Supp. at 1262, 1269-70.
38. Id. at 1263. The Feminitt court phrased this "good-faith" defense in terms of "whether
the defendants were motivated by a bona fide concern over medical or ethical standards rather
than by anticompetitive animus." Id. at 1269. Although the Feminist "good faith" test is worka-
ble, its consistency with the legislative intent and judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act is
questionable. See 21 CONG. REc. 2456-57 (1890) (comments of Sen. Sherman). As Justice Bran-
deis stated in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1917), even under the rule of
reason, a good intention will not save an otherwise objectionable regulation. Id. at 238.
39. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). In Mackey, plaintiff
challenged the Rozelle Rule, an NFL rule that required a club signing a free agent to compensate
the free agent's former club. Although the subject matter of Mackey was fundamentally different
from the learned profession cases, the Mackey court proposed an analytical method that may be
applied in the learned profession context. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
40. The Mackey court, finding less restrictive means were available in the case at bar, found
the defendant guilty of violating the Sherman Act under this rule of reason analysis. 543 F.2d at
621. The court offered a possible interpretation to the ambiguities left by the Goldfarb Court
regarding the learned professions. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
Applying the two-prong Mackey test to the learned professions properly focuses on the corn-
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In Boddicker v. Arizona State DentalAssociation4' the Ninth Circuit
read Goldfarb as requiring a professional association's alleged per se
restraint to contribute directly to improving public service in order to
escape per se analysis.4" The Boddicker court reasoned that restraints
suppressing only professional competition deserve per se analysis.43
The court stated, however, that ad hoc rule of reason analysis was re-
quired if the restraint directly aided the public and thus served the in-
tended purpose of the professions.44
The Supreme Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States45 attempted to clarify its vague Goldfarb opinion4 6 by
prescribing per se analysis whenever per se violations were alleged
against professional organizations. 47  The Court held that a profes-
mercial effect of the alleged restraint rather than allowing unwarranted good faith defenses as in
Feminists. See note 38 supra. When the pernicious effect of the alleged per se restraint is unclear,
the Mackey essential or least restrictive means test flows logically from antitrust precedent, 543
F.2d at 621, but it could lead to an across the board application of the rule of reason when
professions are involved. Professional expertise may make the pernicious effects of the alleged
restraint uncertain. See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (Court gives great deference to opinions of state medical boards). See
also Kaplin, supra note 5.
41. 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
42. In Boddicker the court was concerned with membership in a state dental association that
was a prerequisite to the practice of dentistry in Arizona. Plaintiffs alleged violations of both § 1
and § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 628.
43. The Boddicker court found justification for its approach in the Supreme Court's Goldfarb
opinion:
As we interpret. . . [Goldfarb], to survive a Sherman Act challenge a particular prac-
tice, rule, or regulation of a profession, whether rooted in tradition or the pronounce-
ments of its organizations, must serve the purpose for which it exists, viz. to serve the
public. That is, it must contribute directly to improving service to the public. Those
which only suppress competition between practitioners will fail to survive the challenge.
This interpretation permits a harmonization of the ends that both the professions and the
Sherman Act serve.
549 F.2d at 632. The Boddicker court implied that a restraint imposed by a professional organiza-
tion which suppresses competition but does not serve the public is subject to cursory per se analy-
sis. Id.
44. Under the Boddicker test, if the profession's alleged per se violation serves no public
interest, it is clearly commercial in nature and will receive per se analysis. If, however, a public
service function may be logically established, the balancing of public benefits against anticompeti-
tive evils is made under rule of reason analysis. 549 F.2d at 632. Thus, Boddicker properly fo-
cuses on the restraint's public benefits without resorting to across the board rule of reason analysis
inconsistent with judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act. See notes 15-16 supra and accom-
panying text; notes 59-63 infra and accompanying text.
45. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
46. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
47. 435 U.S. at 695.
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sional society's ban on competitive bidding was a per se price fixing
violation under the Sherman Act.48 The Court in making its determi-
nation, however, referred to both the rule of reason and the per se rule.
This reasoning has cast doubt on the precedential value of the case49
and lower courts consequently remained in doubt as to the proper level
of scrutiny.s
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Association5 exhibited the confusion that has characterized decisions
after NationalEngineers. The court held that only if a per se violation
by a professional association does not relate solely to a commercial
purpose will the courts implement a rule of reason analysis. 2 The
Maricopa court cited the National Engineers opinion 3 for support of
this rule of reason analysis, although the National Engineers Court es-
poused a per se analysis. 4
In Wilk v. AMA55 the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois instructed the jury that it was to determine whether the AMA's
alleged per se violations had an adverse impact upon the public inter-
est.5 6 Judge Bua stated that reasonable actions by the AMA not aimed
at preventing chiropractors from practicing within the limits allowed by
state license were lawful if they did not significantly or unnecessarily
48. Id. The Court found that the ban had a blatantly pernicious impact on the engineering
profession. Id. But see note 49 infra.
49. The Court considered the public benefit of the alleged restraint and its noncommercial
nature, 435 U.S. at 695, as required by Boddicker. See note 44 supra. But the Court gave conflict-
ing signals regarding what type of analysis it had used. Compare 435 U.S. at 693 ("on itsface, this
agreement restrains trade within the meaning of § I of the Sherman Act") (emphasis added) with
id. at 696 ("the rule of reason does not support a defense. . . that competition is unreasonable.")
(emphasis added). See generally 58 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1065, 1070-71 (1980); notes 51-54 infra and
accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, 643 F.2d 553, 555-56 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 979 (1981); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 485 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1360 (1981).
51. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, 643 F.2d'553 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
450 U.S. 979 (1981).
52. Id. at 560.
53. Id.
54. The question whether the NationalEngineers Court used a per se or rule of reason analy-
sis is unclear. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
55. No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. IlM Jan. 30, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1331 (7th Cir. Feb. 26,
1981).
56. Instructions to Jury, supra note 2, at 7138-40.
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affect the chiropractors' ability to carry on their trade.57 The court in-
structed the jury that in determining liability it should consider four
factors: the genuineness of the defendant's justification advanced in
support of the restraint, the manner of enforcing the restraint, the rea-
sonableness of the restraint, and the resulting effect on trade or
commerce.
58
The Wilk instructions strike the proper balance between the certainty
of per se analysis59 and the need to consider the public service aspect of
professions.60 The court properly focused on the public benefit aspect
of the alleged per se restraint 6' without causing confusion as to the
proper scope of scrutiny in antitrust cases involving professions. Judge
Bua's instructions adhere to the concerns of the Goldfarb Court62 by
acknowledging that the actions of a professional organization may re-
quire rule of reason analysis even when a per se violation is alleged.63
Although the Feminist court proposed an adequate balancing test,64
its inclusion of a good faith requirement6 5 conflicts with both the legis-
lative intent of the Sherman Act66 and antitrust precedent. 67 Similarly,
the Mackey68 court's essential restraint or least restrictive means test69
fails to strike a prbper balance. The Mackey test, if applied to re-
straints imposed by a learned profession, would mandate an across-the-
board rule of reason analysis because professional expertise requires an
inquiry into whether the restraint is essential to a competitive balance.
Finally, the National Engineers7" and Maricopa7 1 opinions fail to ac-
count for the legitimate public interest concerns of professional
organizations.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 15-16 & 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
61. Instructions to Jury, supra note 2, at 7138-40.
62. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
63. Instructions to Jury, supra note 2, at 7138-40.
64. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 38 supra.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
69. Id.
70. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
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The Wilk court adopted a standard72 consistent with the Boddicker
test.73 Courts in the future should follow the lead of Wilk and Boddick-
er in order to clarify an unsettled area of antitrust analysis.
A .N.
72. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
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